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Abstract This paper aims to enhance tangibility of the
resilience engineering concept by facilitating understand-
ing and operationalization of weak resilience signals
(WRSs) in the rail sector. Within complex socio-technical
systems, accidents can be seen as unwanted outcomes
emerging from uncontrolled sources of entropy (functional
resonance). Various theoretical models exist to determine
the variability of system interactions, the resilience state
and the organization’s intrinsic abilities to reorganize and
manage their functioning and adaptive capacity to cope
with unexpected and unforeseen disruptions. However,
operationalizing and measuring concrete and reliable
manifestations of resilience and assessing their impact at a
system level have proved to be a challenge. A multi-
method, ethnographic observation and resilience ques-
tionnaire, were used to determine resilience baseline con-
ditions at an operational rail traffic control post. This paper
describes the development, implementation and initial
validation of WRSs identified and modeled around a
‘performance system boundary.’ In addition, a WRS
analysis function is introduced to interpret underlying
factors of the performance WRSs and serves as a method to
reveal potential sources of future resonance that could
comprise system resilience. Results indicate that perfor-
mance WRSs can successfully be implemented to accen-
tuate relative deviations from resilience baseline
conditions. A WRS analysis function can help to interpret
these divergences and could be used to reveal (creeping)
change processes and unnoticed initiating events that
facilitate emergence that degrades rail-system resilience.
Establishing relevant change signals in advance can con-
tribute to anticipation and awareness, enhance organiza-
tional learning and stimulate resilient courses of action and
adaptive behavior that ensures rail operation reliability.
Keywords Resilience  Ethnographic observation 
Railway signaling  Weak resilience signal  WRS  WRS
analysis function  Resilience state model for railway
systems
1 Introduction
We currently live in an increasingly tightly coupled and
interactively complex world in which unpredictable events
are omnipresent, and the velocity with which unanticipated
events can amplify into unwanted outcomes is continually
increasing (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Within this setting,
the railway industry is broadly recognized as an example of
a safety-critical and complex socio-technical system (e.g.,
Wilson et al. 2007; Belmonte et al. 2011). To maintain
control, enhance efficiency and improve safe operations in
the rail industry, a rise in automation (Wilson and Norris
2005), standardization and strict adherence to protocols and
predefined timetables (off-line time-tabling; Goverde and
Odijk 2002; Hansen 2010) has been notable over the years.
This optimization rationale enabled the European railway
to become an ultra-safe system (one accident per one
million events; Amalberti 2001; European Railway Agency
2014). This, combined with the search for sustainable
transport solutions, induced political focus on rail trans-
portation throughout Europe (Ferreira et al. 2011).
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However, to meet and maintain the high levels of perfor-
mance (e.g., punctuality, capacity and safety) that are
required to realize this potential, linear and additive opti-
mization solutions (e.g., more rules and regulations) may
prove to be insufficient (e.g., Bieder and Bourrier 2013).
Unwanted outcomes in ultra-safe complex socio-technical
systems ‘emerge’ from a combination of unanticipated,
nonlinear relationships between constituent parts of the
system that can arise under dynamic operating conditions
(Leveson 2004; Dekker et al. 2008). This causes the system
to contain hidden fragilities with respect to rare and rela-
tively unpredictable perturbations, making the system
robust yet fragile (RYF; Doyle et al. 2005). The railway
system thus faces the challenge of finding alternative
methods to enhance performance and outmaneuver (con-
fusing) system complexity (de Carvalho 2011).
The resilience (systems) approach is considered to be
the next step (e.g., Qureshi 2008) and has become, argu-
ably, the dominant paradigm in the study of complex socio-
technical systems (Underwood and Waterson 2013). Resi-
lience engineering can be defined as a proactive approach
concerned with enhancing organizations’ intrinsic abilities
to reorganize and manage their functioning and adaptive
capacity prior to, during or following events, so that the
system can sustain the required level of operations under
both expected and unexpected conditions (Woods and
Branlat 2010; Hollnagel 2014). Resilience should thus be
seen as an emergent property originating from what an
organization does, rather than what an organization has,
emphasizing function over structure and ability over
capacity (Hollnagel 2004). Different theoretical models are
available and have been used over the years to describe the
resilient state of a system (e.g., the ball and cup model:
Scheffer et al. 1993; safe operating envelope: Rasmussen
1997; stress–strain (S–S) model: Woods and Wreathall
2008; resilience analysis grid (RAG): Hollnagel 2011;
functional resonance analysis method (FRAM): Hollnagel
2012). Among resilience researchers, there is general
consensus that people are the primary source of resilience
(e.g., Woods et al. 2007). In accordance, providing tech-
niques and system designs that help people and organiza-
tions cope with complexity might thus be one method to
enhance system resilience. However, without a clear
understanding of what manifestations of resilience look
like (Back et al. 2008), it will be difficult to identify such
manifestations in practice and quantify the theoretical
models developed, creating a research–practice gap (Un-
derwood and Waterson 2013). This is especially true when
focusing on quantifying resilience for infrastructural sys-
tems, in which the current quantification methods used
(e.g., graph theory: Berche et al. 2009; fuzzy interference:
Heaslip et al. 2010) emanate from other well-established
and well-elaborated methodological frameworks but as
such are not fully capable of capturing the underlying
interrelations of system modules (Tamvakis and Xenidis
2013). Research aimed at operationalizing theoretical
resilience models and prospective analysis frameworks for
quantifying resilience of infrastructure systems is required
(e.g., Madni and Jackson 2009).
Siegel and Schraagen (2014) contributed to diminishing
the research–practice gap by developing a so-called ‘re-
silience state model’ for railway systems. This model is
based on Rasmussen’s (1997) safe operating envelope, the
stress–strain model described by Woods and Wreathall
(2008), and adheres to the notion that knowledge and error
flow from the same mental sources (Mach 1905; Hollnagel
2012). Siegel and Schraagen (2014) adapted the three
(relative) system boundaries defined by Rasmussen (1997)
(performance, economy and workload) to describe and
explain the various (external) pressures—safety, perfor-
mance (capacity and punctuality) and workload—that
affect the operating state of a railway system. In addition, a
depth dimension was added to the model that enables dif-
ferentiation between internal changes that keep the system
in a resilient state or have it move toward brittleness. The
stress–strain model (Woods and Wreathall 2008) charac-
terizes the properties of an organization as an adaptive
system by using an analogy from materials engineering
which focuses on the relationship between the external and
varying demand on a mechanical structure (stress), and
how the structure stretches in response (strain). Siegel and
Schraagen (2014) use changes in the linear relation
between stress and strain (i.e., Young’s modulus slope) to
model quantifiable rail weak resilience signals (WRSs).
A WRS indicates a change in the system’s operating state
and is defined by measuring properties in the base capacity
region of the system that signals changes of properties in
the extra adaptive region of the system. In this model, the
base capacity reflects the ‘normal’ functioning response of
the system to external events. The extra adaptive capacity
reflects the potential discrepancy between adaptive system
responses and external demands that challenge or fall
outside the boundaries of the base operating capacity
(Woods et al. 2014). In other words, WRSs represent
uncertain snippets of information, hidden within the ‘nor-
mal’ system variability, which could be used as situated
indicators to signal potential change processes in the
organizations’ resilience level. The ‘resilience state model’
for railway systems is thus described as a framework for
generic quantifiable modeling of rail WRSs around three
(relative) system boundaries (workload, performance and
safety; Siegel and Schraagen 2014). Previous research
indicated that changes around the workload boundary
could be successfully measured, identified and used to
quantify workload WRSs (Siegel and Schraagen 2014). In
this paper, we extend implementation of the WRS
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framework to the performance boundary. Since within rail
systems the quality of performance is, to a large extent,
based on time-related key performance indicators, specific
methods to measure and quantify changes in punctuality
and rail capacity need to be defined.
To develop operational parameters that identify changes
around the performance boundary, baseline conditions
(acceptable levels of performance) of the current operating
state should be established where deviations can be mea-
sured against. Examining the current operating state will
enhance insight into and understanding of how WRSs arise
and support the interpretation of the WRSs indicated
through the WRS framework. In addition, focusing on
different elements that comprise or serve as alternative and
additional performance indicators (i.e., analysis functions)
might help to further enhance interpretation, understanding
and analysis of rail WRSs indicated through the frame-
work. To investigate the factors influencing the operating
state, this paper adheres to Hollnagel’s (2009) notion that
management of uncertainty and system variability in the
(real-time) operation is built around four main system
capabilities defining resilience: responding to the actual
(knowing what to do), monitoring the critical (knowing
what to look for), anticipating the potential (knowing what
to expect) and learning from the factual (knowing what has
happened).
The overall aim of this research is to enhance tangibility
of resilience by facilitating understanding and opera-
tionalization of rail weak resilience signals. The research
question is threefold: (1) How can the baseline conditions
that comprise the current resilience operating state of the
socio-technical rail system be determined? (2) How can the
resilience state model for railway systems be further
developed to enable quantification and operationalization
of performance WRSs? and (3) Can a WRS analysis
function enhance interpreting and understanding of
(creeping) factors that underlie performance WRSs?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the multi-
method research approach will be described, and opera-
tional WRS parameters will be introduced. Resilience
baseline conditions will be identified, and quantification of
WRSs on the punctuality boundary will be explicated upon.
In conclusion, the main points and results will be discussed
and an outlook on future research will be provided.
2 Method
A multi-method approach was used to acquire data and
knowledge about the current operating state of the system
(i.e., identify performance indicators). Influenced by the
interdisciplinary research fields of human–computer inter-
action and computer-supported cooperative work (e.g.,
Herrmann et al. 2004; Millen 2000), an ethnographically
informed method was adopted to construct adequate
understanding of the working environment, discover
exceptional and beneficial user behavior and provide
additional insights into social and organizational
phenomena.
2.1 Research setting
The research took place at a rail control post in Zwolle.
This rail control post, one out of 13, handles rail stations
and train traffic in the northeastern part of the Netherlands.
To bolster rail operation reliability and efficiency, the setup
of the control room (Fig. 1) consists of eight workstations
divided into two main rail corridors: south–north, called
corridor North (four workstations), and west–east, called
corridor East (three workstations). A corridor is defined as
a large area of rail infrastructure that consists of adjacent
rail sections from various (interdependent) workstations.
Within this setup, train dispatchers work in small ‘corridor’
teams consisting of approximately 3–4 people, one planner
(executive logistics focus) and 2–3 train dispatchers (safety
focus), who rotate in positions. The one remaining work-
station is exclusively utilized during calamities and is
readily available to either corridor as a means to provide
added resources and capacity.
The population consisted of a convenience sample of 25
rail dispatchers (five females, 20 males) working at least
24 h a week. Because both senior as well as junior dis-
patchers were included in the sample, years of experience
in train dispatching ranged from 2 to 37 years (M = 18.5,
SD = 10.55). In addition, age varied between 29 and
65 years (M = 47, SD = 8.72).
2.2 Resilience observations
The observations took place over a period of 2 non-con-
tiguous weeks. During the first week, three researchers
pulled rotating shifts of 8 h to fully cover the rail dis-
patcher’s proceedings during day and night shifts (24/7). In
the second week, two researchers observed the domain
practitioners between 7:00 AM and 9:00 PM, logging a
total of 266 h of observation. Since the presence of people
other than the rail dispatchers is not uncommon in the
control room, disruption of the natural setting was mini-
mized. This non-obtrusiveness allowed the researchers to
roam around freely to observe and interview the rail dis-
patchers as opportunities presented themselves. In order to
guide this process and enhance the efficiency, outcomes of
real-time workload measurements were used to focus on
situations in which train dispatchers experienced increased
workload. Workload measurements were conducted using
an automated version of the Integrated Workload Scale
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(IWS; Pickup et al. 2005), a unidimensional self-report tool
consisting of a 9-point scale in which 1 = not demanding
and 9 = work too demanding, that enabled numerical
entering of rail dispatchers’ subjective workload at 5-min
intervals. An interface was developed to display the 5-min
interval entering of the subjective workload for all indi-
vidual rail dispatchers and all individual workstations in
real time (Fig. 2). To distinguish between different rail
dispatchers who worked at the same working station, a
unique but anonymous numerical code had to be entered at
the beginning of a rail dispatcher’s shift. The purpose of
the interface was to enhance rapid identification of (rela-
tively) busy work situations. To enable this, the height of
the bar charts was adjusted according to the 5-min interval
scores and different (rainbow) colors were chosen to
visualize the IWS scores (with 1 = purple and 9 = dark
red). The general configuration of the interface was set to
display the current hour; however, time slots of 2, 3, 6 and
12 h were also available.
Although the observations as well as the conversations
were mainly centered around the dispatchers’ current
actions, the work in general and prior situations (that either
turned out unexpectedly good or resulted in unwanted
outcomes and safety issues) was also discussed with dis-
patchers retrospectively. The purpose of this was twofold:
(1) to enhance understanding and (2) to fill the (potential)
observational research gap which occurs due to the fact that
the European railway has become an ultra-safe system
(Amalberti 2001). Since in an ultra-safe system on average
only one accident occurs per a million events, the chances
of us observing such an event during the observation period
are close to zero. It is, however, of utmost importance to
know how the dispatchers would handle, or have handled,
such situations. Therefore, within the context of the current
Fig. 1 Corridor North (1, 2, 3, 4) and corridor East (5, 6, 7) and corresponding rail trajectories
Fig. 2 Monitoring interface for the observer (eight workstations with resolution time setting)
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as well as the prior situations, particular attention was
placed on capturing concrete examples in which the com-
plexity of the environment, in either routine or disturbed
situations, required resilient behavior. The Resilience
Markers Framework by Furniss et al. (2011), which is used
to systematically observe concrete manifestations of resi-
lience at different levels of granularity within and across
domains, was used to document the cognitive, collabora-
tive strategies and facilitating activities used to handle
situation demands. This framework distinguishes three
levels: (1) resilience markers, (2) resilience strategies and
(3) resilience observations. Attributes and an example of
the different levels are shown in Table 1.
2.3 Weak resilience signals
To resolve potential resilience gaps that surface from the
base activity (i.e., through observations) and reveal other
issues and sources of future resonance that could comprise
system resilience in the long term, operationalization and
implementation of WRSs were conducted. To measure
workload WRSs, Siegel and Schraagen (2014) introduced a
new metric, stretch, which can be defined as an objective or
a subjective system reaction to an external (cluster) event.
An objective stretch is used to identify an absolute work-
load growth and is comprised of two main components:
task complexity and events. Task complexity is composed
of real-time technical system measurement and readily
available (log) data of rail dispatchers’ main job require-
ments: monitoring of rail movement, performance of plan
mutations, execution of manual actions and communication
activities. Events are defined as external events, i.e., not
controlled by the operators themselves, that can influence
the operator’s task load (e.g., section and switch disrup-
tions, rail track maintenance data, number of delayed trains
and the number of phone calls). The total number of events
is calculated and measured in 5-min intervals. This value is
normalized between 1 and 2 and multiplied with the task
complexity resulting in the external task load (XTL). The
subjective stretch is the human perception of the system’s
strain and embodies the (cumulative) workload effort
during a period of time in which IWS scores deviate from
an IWS baseline. In this context, an IWS baseline is defined
as the steady-state IWS rating before and after a disruption
occurs (i.e., the IWS rating during scheduled rail move-
ments). Since we were looking for relative changes in
workload experienced by individual rail dispatchers, it was
decided not to weigh the IWS scores to account for sub-
jective variability due to competence. The time span of the
objective and subjective stretch can differ if the activity in
the system started earlier or ended later than the workload
shift perceived by the rail dispatcher. Therefore, the start
time and end time of a stretch are adjusted to the first XTL-
minimum moment before the IWS rising from, and after
the IWS returning to, the IWS baseline. The ratio between
the subjective and objective stretch is used to identify
workload WRSs.
When a growing change of a stretch ratio is identified
and the stretch values are larger than a predefined
(threshold) value, a weak resilience signal (WRS) is gen-
erated. To indicate significant and relative changes when
comparing two periods, the accumulated standard deviation
(SD) of the stretch ratio in each period was used (for more
information, see Siegel and Schraagen 2014). The work-
load WRSs were measured and used as a starting point and
reference frame, to extend operationalization of the rail
WRS framework to the performance boundary. To opera-
tionalize and utilize performance WRSs, identification and
implementation requirements had to be established.
The operational parameters for the performance
boundary are entirely based on technical system mea-
surement and readily available (log) data. Since the rail
capacity is generally stable over the year (e.g., due to pre-
defined and optimized offline timetabling; Goverde and
Odijk 2002; Hansen 2010), differences between the pre-
defined timetable (scheduled planning) and the working
timetable (real-time measurements of rail movements)
were used to measure performance WRSs. The main
focus was placed on delay development, and propagation,
within the rail system and how this impacts the punctu-
ality boundary (i.e., buffering capacity, flexibility, margin
and tolerance; Woods and Cook 2006). Adhering to rail-
dispatching guidelines concerning time lag and rail
movement, a train was considered delayed if the deviation
from the pre-defined timetable exceeded a 3-min
threshold.
Table 1 Levels, attributes and an example of the hierarchy (Furniss et al. 2011)
Level Generalizability Quantity Example
Markers High Low Maximizing information extraction
Strategy Moderate Moderate Creating an external cue
Observation Low High A paperclip to bookmark a page in the procedure someone is following
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By providing actionable attention cues, the WRSs will
contribute to revealing eroding levels of (operational)
system resilience. The attention cues are visualized by
generating graphical representations (WRS graphs created
in Excel). In addition, the WRSs serve as an objective
method (i.e., based on technical system data measure-
ments) to approach the resilience base capability levels
observed.
To guide the process of selecting WRSs that need to be
dealt with, analysis functions will be constructed. An
analysis function serves as an alternated frame of refer-
ence that is based on other or additional performance
indicators (i.e., besides the punctuality data). The aim of
implementing an analysis function is to exclude the ‘ev-
ident, known and obvious’ causes of resonance, and shift
attention to reveal ‘hidden, unmarked or ignored’ pro-
cesses and incident precursors that could affect rail-sys-
tem resilience.
2.4 Resilience Questionnaire
Concurrent with the second week of observations, a resi-
lience questionnaire was distributed by e-mail among all
rail dispatchers and the management (N = 67) as a cross-
referential method to measure the (operational) resilience
level within the rail control post. An online rather than on-
paper survey method was chosen due to the shift roster. To
boost the response rate, a reminder e-mail was sent the
following week and a reminder message was placed in the
organization’s weekly newsletter.
The ADAPTER questionnaire (Analyzing and Devel-
oping Adaptability and Performance in Teams to Enhance
Resilience; van der Beek and Schraagen 2015) was selec-
ted because the questionnaire is suited to diagnose team
resilience requirements of safety critical jobs and can be
administered within a relatively short time period. In
ADAPTER, the four essential abilities of resilience
(Hollnagel 2009) are supplemented with relation-oriented
abilities such as leadership and (cross-boundary) coopera-
tion, to operationalize the concept of team resilience.
Although the questionnaire was already available in Dutch,
it was decided to slightly change the wording of some
questions to better fit the terminology used within the
railway organization. In addition, an N/A category option
was added, where appropriate, to ensure valid answers and
avoid positive skewness of answer categories which were
not applicable for our specific situation (e.g., the N/A
category was added to questions relating to ‘cooperation
with other teams’ since in rail control this often involves
cooperating across organizational boundaries in which not
all information about the other teams is known or avail-
able). To evaluate the ADAPTER results, we used the
method of van der Beek and Schraagen (2015) to compute
descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for the whole
sample.
3 Results
3.1 Real-time dispatching observations
The transportation planning within the Dutch railway sys-
tem is a highly dynamic multifaceted process. Within this
context, train dispatchers coordinate and manage the
(conflicting) demands placed on track use and integrate
multiple sources of information to conduct trade-off deci-
sions and actions necessary (e.g., re-routing, re-ordering
and re-timing of trains, tracks and signals) to maintain
performance, regain control and mitigate potential threats.
Especially in uncertain, time pressured and variable traffic
situations, in which train dispatchers are pushed toward the
limits of their regular operating (base) capacity and the
adaptive capacity of the system is challenged (e.g., Woods
et al. 2014), handling the situational demands proves to be
a cognitively complex task. It is in those instances that
resilient strategies and behaviors are required and boundary
conditions of adaptive capacity, as well as localization of
those boundaries, might be exposed (Woods and Cook
2006; Dekker 2011). For this reason, observations and
description of resilient behavior were focused around high-
pressure situations.
In the next section, one of the observed high-pressure
situations will be delineated. This illustrative case provides
insight into the concrete manifestations of resilient dis-
patcher performance, as well as subsequent vulnerabilities,
and serves as a baseline measure for the (operational)
resilience conditions currently present within the
organization.
3.1.1 Example of a high-pressure situation: ‘the hooligan
case’
On 2-4-2014, a major disruptive event unfolded when
soccer hooligans ignited fireworks and smoke bombs on a
rail station platform and the mobile police unit was forced
to intervene. As is standard procedure in such high-pres-
sure situations, the emergency workplace was put into
operation (as a means of reinforcement to handle perfor-
mance variability, minimize timetable disruptions and
mitigate the rapidly increasing delays). In these situations,
the dispatcher responsible for the rail trajectory in which
the disruption occurs focuses on the direct (short-term)
actions involved with the disruption handling (i.e., quick
responsive action to train and timetable delays directly
resulting from the disturbance) while the ‘emergency’
dispatcher assists by taking over verbal communication
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with other actors (i.e., telephone calls from train drivers)
and (long-term) planning activities. As is the case in almost
all high-pressure situations, the corridor team was unable to
integrate and develop implications for this specific situa-
tion based on the full set of information held by all actors
involved (Woolley et al. 2008). This due to the fact that no
direct line of communication could be established between
the rail control center and the commander, nor other
members, of the mobile police unit. Therefore, the corridor
team initially chooses to arrange disruption handling of
delayed trains based on the incoming order of notifications
in the system. This method of prioritizing (short-term)
proved to be inadequate and even counterproductive in the
long term due to escalating knock-on delays for connecting
trains (i.e., working at cross-purposes). This process was
noticed by the post manager, approximately 15 min after
the incident occurred, who directly stressed the importance
of developing and implementing an action plan to properly
deal with this situation. To fill the information gap, rail
dispatchers used the live camera feed from the station
platforms (Fig. 3). By monitoring the police actions on
scene, rail dispatchers were able to enhance their overall
situation awareness. Concurrently, the internal communi-
cation channels/structure were optimized. Two corridor
team members gathered behind the rail dispatcher’s
workstation (responsible for the rail section where the
disturbance took place) in order to listen in on communi-
cation and look at the monitor displays to gain insight into
train movement and the overall rail situation on the sur-
rounding tracks. Subsequently, this information was shared
with train dispatchers manning the neighboring rail sec-
tions. Implementation of the action plan resulted in highly
selective rail movement in the disruptive rail section (e.g.,
prioritizing international trains), and gradual redirection of
stationary and delayed trains occupying adjacent rail tracks
to the nearest available railway station.
3.1.2 Resilience behavior episodes
Administering the Resilience Markers Framework by
Furniss et al. (2011), two resilience behavior episodes were
distinguished for this specific situation. (1) Recognition of
inappropriate situation handling and avoiding escalation of
commitment. (2) Tailoring of existing artifacts to maxi-
mize information extraction.
Recognition of inappropriate situation handling and
avoiding escalation of commitment (i.e., the tendency to
continue a chosen course of action even when changing to
a new course would be preferable; (Staw 1981)) were
related to the strategy ‘provision of feedback to enable
error correction’ (Blandford and Furniss 2006) and the
broader marker of ‘recognizing and responding to failure’.
Although the recognition and notification of malfunc-
tioning initiated the corrective actions necessary to man-
age the performance variability in this situation, the
insight came rather late and was only noted by one actor
(the post manager) within the corridor team. Although it
could be argued that the post manager has a high level of
experience and as such might outperform the operational
competence skill level of the other corridor team members,
the tasks of a post manager and a rail dispatcher are of a
different nature. As such, the post manager’s skills and
experience do not translate one-to-one to the abilities and
experience of the corridor team members. An alternative
explanation could be that the post manager provided a
fresh perspective which led to a broader set of actions.
This situation exposed potential vulnerabilities (e.g.,
maintaining adequate situational overview and awareness
in high-pressure demands, acknowledgment of inappro-
priate actions and or routines) which could influence
learning and anticipation of future resonance and disrup-
tion handling. This notion was strengthened by irregular-
ities observed in the levels of operational performance
within and between dispatchers and situations. Similar
prioritizing decisions could be observed with other dis-
patchers over different shifts (e.g., answering incoming
phone calls rather than prioritizing timetable changes,
which would have been more efficient).
Tailoring of existing artifacts to maximize information
extraction can be related to the strategies ‘prepare for
future work’ (Blandford and Furniss 2006) and ‘cue cre-
ation in action’ (Perin 2005), with the broader markers of
‘preparation’ and ‘strategies that maximize information
extraction’ (Blandford and Furniss 2006). The awareness
of (incoming) data limitations and the proactive steps taken
at present (i.e., enhanced monitoring) increased the readi-
ness to adequately respond to ongoing developmentsFig. 3 Live camera feed from the station platforms
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(efficient management of the performance variability) and
provided the opportunity to anticipate and prepare for
future situational demands.
3.1.3 Weak resilience signals
The operational parameters for the workload WRS set by
Siegel and Schraagen (2014) were used to determine if the
hooligan case could indeed be labeled as a high-pressure
situation and if the system detected it as such. A WRS can
be defined looking at three features: a (relatively) long
stretch duration, high (average) IWS or XTL scores and
discrepancies in the stretch ratio. A graphical representa-
tion of the workload stretch measures was generated by
plotting all the objective versus the subjective stretches of
that day relative to an empirically drawn threshold line
(i.e., the rounded sum of the means with one standard
deviation above). Since the stretches in Fig. 4 are signifi-
cantly correlated (r = .94, p\ .05), the threshold line
serves as a visual guide to optimize the selection of stret-
ches that deserve attention, by serving as a WRS. In Fig. 4,
the x-axis represents the stretch duration x IWS scores. The
stretch duration is derived by the sum of total minutes a
stretch occurred representing the 5-min time slots. In
addition, the mean IWS score can be calculated for each
stretch. The y-axis indicates the sum of technical system
activity measured in a specific stretch, also taking into
account the 5-min time slots.
From the graph, it becomes clear that most stretches that
occurred on 2-4-2014 were small and do not exceed the
boundaries of the safe operating envelope (Rasmussen
1997). Ad hoc analysis revealed that five workload stret-
ches in Fig. 4 are caused by the same underlying (de-
compensation) event, the ignition of fireworks and smoke
bombs on the rail tracks and station platform by soccer
hooligans (‘Hooligan Case’ in Fig. 4). Looking at these
five stretches in relation to the three WRS features, it is
evident that all stretches have a (rather) long stretch
duration with increased mean IWS scores (circa 5–6,
indicating moderate pressure to very busy). In addition to
an increased IWS average, all stretches also contained
5-min periods rated with the three highest IWS scores
(7 = extreme effort, 8 = struggling to keep up, and
9 = work too demanding). The stretches also have
increased levels of technical system activity (i.e., due to
telephony and manual re-routing quantities) and enlarged
deviations in the stretch ratio (see stretch number 2). All in
all, the hooligan case can indeed be classified as a high-
pressure situation.
To validate and verify the performance WRS constructs,
(log) data were examined to determine whether the
decompensation event that unfolded during that day could
also have been identified using performance WRS data
methods. A spike in delay development was identified for
trains in the 1700 series, indicating a segment of 36 trains
traveling the same rail trajectory (Fig. 5). The upward
slope could be explained by three ‘hooligan trains’ (all part
of the 1700 series). Two trains suffered imminent, rapidly
increasing timetable delays due to the fact that they could
not leave the station as a direct result of hooligans and
fireworks on the tracks. The third train was used by the riot
police to forcefully transport soccer hooligans out of the
station. In addition, knock-on delays occurred due to the
fact that trains retained from departure occupied the rail
platforms. This induced red rail signals (an increase of
9.2 % above average) for connecting trains, forcing trains
to wait on rail tracks surrounding the station.
3.1.4 WRS analysis function
The successful identification of the known hooligan event
(i.e., it was observed during the ethnographic study) con-
tributes to verification of the WRS method. Deviations
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steady state of a rail control post in which rail movements
occur as planned without any intervention, could be
established on the workload as well as the punctuality
boundary. However, signaling of the hooligan event does
not immediately create insight and understanding into the
unknown variables in the normal performance variability
that could indicate potential creeping sources of future
resonance that may underlie the incident. Relatively long-
lasting disruptive events with a big impact factor (i.e.,
affecting multiple trains and dispatchers) are likely to gain
attention among actors in the system even without WRS
indications. However, when such an event is already
known, attention is needlessly diverted which may result in
obscuring other unidentified potential factors that influence
the resilience state. To enhance the organization’s feedback
control loop (Doyle et al. 2013) and increase the under-
standing, tracking and anticipation of potential sources of
future resonance and or the impact factors of the different
WRSs indicated by the framework, implementation of
WRS analysis functions is proposed. An analysis function
is described as an alternated frame of reference, based on
other or additional performance indicators, which guides
the process of selecting WRSs that need to be dealt with.
The aim of this analysis function is to exclude the ‘evident,
known and obvious’ causes of resonance, and attempt to
shift attention and reveal ‘hidden, unknown or ignored’
processes that could affect rail-system resilience. To
demonstrate the concept and implementation of this prin-
ciple, a punctuality WRS analysis function was established
for the hooligan scenario which will be described in more
detail in the next section. It is important to note, however,
that the use of analysis functions is not limited to high-
pressure situations. Analysis functions are equally appli-
cable to and well suited to uncover (creeping) incident
precursors in routine situations.
Implementation of the WRS analysis function allows the
frame of reference for the punctuality boundary to be
manually altered by excluding trains with exorbitant delays
due to well-known escalation events (i.e., the hooligan
trains) and by comparing the real-time delay measurements
to specified base line conditions (performance indicators;
train series and specified dates). To test the applicability of
the WRS analysis function method, the delay data from the
second week of observations were re-examined (Fig. 6).
The three hooligan trains, which caused the exorbitant
delays, were excluded from the analysis. Ad hoc analysis
revealed an upward trend in delay development for the
1700 series. It could be argued that an average delay
development increase of 1.7 min (102 s) per train does not
exceed the predefined organizational threshold of C3 min
delay and, as such, does not require further investigation.
However, it could be beneficial to examine whether
specific trains in this series contribute invariably to this
delay development and whether this upward trend contin-
ues over time (e.g., the consecutive days or weeks). In
addition, the time delays may impact the time buffers built-
in on the pre-defined timetable and as such influence the
rail dispatcher’s workload. Such information could aid in
forestalling and anticipating future resonance emerging
from ‘seemingly insignificant’ (creeping) change patterns
and might even identify commonalities in the operating
state preceding well-known events.
WRSs and WRS analysis functions should be created to
(visually) support the train dispatcher’s comprehension of
the current operating state and resilience status and to
enhance prediction of possible incidents and accidents in
the future by guiding attention to aspects that deserve
further analysis. They provide a means to an end and will
not in themselves present an integrated approach to
improve the resilience or related aspects of the system. In
other words, rather than directing the domain practitioners
along a defined path, exploratory content that allows for
comparison between data is provided.
3.2 Resilience questionnaire
The response rate to the questionnaire was calculated
according to the American Association for Public Opinion
Research (2015) RR1 definition. Of the 67 employees
contacted, one person no longer worked for the company
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Fig. 6 WRS analysis function applied on delay data from the 1700
series
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This resulted in a RR1: 22/65 = 34 %, which is accept-
able for online surveys (Nulty 2008). The sample demo-
graphics were as follows: 16 rail dispatchers, three
managers and three front office employees. In total, two
females and 20 males answered the resilience question-
naire. Results from the ADAPTER questionnaire (Table 2)
are consistent with the resilience baseline conditions and
current operating state of the system ascertained during the
observations in that the domain practitioners rated the
resilience constructs monitoring and responding higher
than the resilience constructs anticipating and learning. It
should be noted, however, that the scores for anticipating
(Mdn = 3.25) and learning (Mdn = 3.17) fall within the
average range of the five point Likert scale, being at
variance with the observational results which indicated
underperformance for these constructs. This could indicate
miscalibration of resilience levels (Woods and Wreathall
2008; i.e., learning construct a = .70 and SD = .43) within
the organization. However, the scores might also be
explained by fluctuation in resilient behavior that was
observed within and between (senior and junior) rail dis-
patchers when they were coping with the (dynamic prop-
agation of) random disturbances during real-time
operation. A Mann–Whitney U test was conducted to
evaluate whether anticipating resilience scores differed
between senior and junior rail dispatchers. Although the
results indicated that anticipating resilience scores between
senior rail dispatchers (Mdn = 11.83) and junior rail dis-
patchers (Mdn = 10.00) were not significantly different,
U = 30.0, p = .608, r = .11, differences in resilient
behavior cannot be ruled out completely since common
and socially desirable answers could have been given by
the rail dispatchers answering the questionnaire. During
real-time operation, specific situational demands could
elicit differences between junior and senior rail dis-
patchers based on experience. Situational demands in
itself might provide an indication as to why the accept-
able degree of internal consistency (a = .70; Tabachnick
and Fidell 2001) was not met since it could also explain
the operational variability observed within individual
dispatchers. This essentially reflects the rail dispatchers’
notions that no situation is alike, even though situations
might appear similar to outsiders since they, for example,
both entail disruption handling due to a broken rail
switch. In addition to the resilience constructs, domain
practitioners assessed the relation-oriented abilities (i.e.,
shared transformational leadership and cooperation with
other teams), which are incorporated into the ADAPTER
questionnaire to operationalize the concept of team resi-
lience, as the least well represented within the organiza-
tion. These results are in line with the resilience
observations. Transformational leadership has proved to
be a leadership style that effectively stimulates knowledge
creation and knowledge sharing at the individual and
group levels (Bryant 2003). The fact that that this ability
is under-represented (Mdn = 3.14) could affect the
learning capabilities of the organization (Zagorsˇek et al.
2009) and as such explain the performance variability
observed. The low rating for cooperation with other teams
(Mdn = 2.54) indicates improvement opportunities for
handlings across organizational and sub-system bound-
aries, such as the communication breakdown that occur-
red in the hooligan example.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Practical implementations and concrete measurement of
resilience are a challenging issue that is inadequately
addressed in current research practices. The purpose of this
research was therefore to take initial steps toward
enhancing operationalization and understanding of resi-
lience metrics in the railway sector and quantification of
the rail-system resilience state. Overall results indicate that
the multi-method approach adopted to establish operational
baseline conditions, based on the four system capabilities
that comprise resilience, is a reliable method to determine
the overall level of rail-system resilience. In addition,
WRSs prove to successfully measure deviations from
predetermined resilience baseline conditions. Although
WRS analysis functions show the potential to enhance
understanding of the underlying and complex system
dynamics that comprise future resonance, more research is





ADAPTER scales n items Mdn SD Cronbach’s alpha (a)
Monitoring 13 3.69 .75 .95
Responding 12 3.46 .75 .90
Anticipating 8 3.25 .77 .68
Learning 9 3.17 .43 .70
Shared transformational leadership 14 3.14 .60 .91
Cooperation with other teams 12 2.54 .65 .71
N = 22. Total scale team resilience: a = .91
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More specifically, it can be stated that triangulation of
the quantitative and qualitative research methods proves to
be a useful means of capturing more detail, minimizing the
effects of research biases and limitation boundaries of the
individual research techniques, and understanding causal
mechanisms. The observation (behavioral) and the resi-
lience questionnaire outcomes (attitudinal) both indicated
that the system capability ‘monitoring’ was best repre-
sented within the organization and that the relation-ori-
ented abilities that represent team resilience were the least
developed, reinforcing the outcomes. Grounding these
results within Hollnagel’s (2009) framework, a (recurring)
pattern emerges that generates insights into the current
practices and how this influences the resilience level and
operating state of the socio-technical system. The com-
monality across all real-time dispatching processes is that
by means of continuously monitoring and quickly
responding, dispatchers try to control the situation and
mitigate potential threats. In essence, this reflects exactly
the current practice of dispatch activities, monitors the
traffic flow and acts accordingly. This generally yields
positive and acceptable levels of performance. However,
performance variability increases when the ‘normal’ sys-
tem functioning (i.e., the corridor team serves as base
adaptive capacity; Woods et al. 2014) is challenged and
disturbances (external events) cascade across sub-system
and organizational boundaries, enhancing the chances for a
system decompensation collapse (Branlat and Woods
2010). To prevent such system breakdowns from happen-
ing, timely notification and anticipation to incident pre-
cursors are crucial. To accomplish this, the theoretical
resilience state model for railway systems (Siegel and
Schraagen 2014) was implemented to measure deviations
from the resilience baseline conditions on the performance
system boundary. The measurements in performance
variability were translated into WRSs that act as prompts
for variables that should be considered. In this process, the
observations and resilience questionnaire provide the nec-
essary contextualization that the technical system metrics
alone are unable to fully capture. The quantification of
WRSs and visualization of cues in a constructive manner
help to close the feedback loop and enhance situation
awareness. Boosting the relation-oriented abilities within
the organization can strengthen these processes and as such
reinforce the overall level of system resilience (Hollnagel
2009). Enhancing cooperation and knowledge sharing with
other teams could, for example, aid in minimizing infor-
mation-processing failures (Woolley et al. 2008) where
transformational leadership (Bass 1990) could contribute to
sense-making, interpretation and understanding of a situa-
tion among all members of the (corridor) team (Bartone
2006). In this context, a WRS analysis function should be
seen as a means to an end. By providing a means of
uncovering potential factors that comprise a WRS, a WRS
analysis function can be implemented to guide the WRS
selection process and enhance corridor team reflectivity. In
this context, reflectivity is defined as the deliberate process
of discussing and evaluating team goals, processes and
outcomes, learning from failure and successes and craft
action intentions for improved future functioning (Ellis
et al. 2014; Schippers et al. 2014).
Although results are promising and preliminary feed-
back from domain practitioners indicates a positive atti-
tude toward implementation of this method, research
limitations should be considered. Even though operational
parameters were chosen that allow for real-time mea-
surement in the future, the current implementations are
based on technological measurement of readily available
log data and were created in retrospect. Further empirical
research is needed in order to validate and verify these
prospects and results during real-time operations. In
addition, the fact that we operated in a real-life setting
poses a limitation with respect to the replication of the
study. Since every rail control post (e.g., the practitioners,
the vibe) is different, and the rail control post themselves
play a crucial role in the outcome, an exact replication of
this study would not necessarily yield similar results.
Although it could be argued that this would be possible in
a simulated environment, replication in such a literal way
was never the main priority for this study. We would
rather invite and encourage other researchers to use this
study as a base and build upon this work. A potential
implication for future work in the line of real-time WRS
research would be to create a fully operational advanced
graphical user interface design, which can be used to test
and capture the complex interactions generated by inter-
related components at system level (e.g., usability
enhancement based on ecological resilience design prin-
ciples). Another option is to mature the implementation of
WRSs and analysis functions by adding specification
criteria and including other resilience boundaries (i.e.,
safety boundary). Furthermore, it could be examined
whether the punctuality WRS and analysis function,
which were created to enhance the system capabilities
learning and anticipating in the railway system, can be
used to enhance these system capabilities in other control
room operations of complex socio-technical systems. In
addition, it could be interesting to explore these metrics in
the broader context of other scientific fields like data
science and predictive statistics.
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